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THE EFFECT OF UNITED STATES LABOR LEGISLATION ON
THE FLAG-OF-CONVENIENCE FLEET: REGULATION
OF SHIPBOARD LABOR RELATIONS AND REMEDIES
AGAINST SHORESIDE PICKETING
To meet foreign competition, many unsubsidized American shipowners,
primarily importers of petroleum and metallic ores, have registered their ves-
sels in several friendly nations '-notably Liberia and Panama2-which exer-
cise little control over ships flying their flags 8 and charge nominal registra-
tion fees.4 These American-owned "flag of convenience" vessels,5 whose ton-
1. Letter From Clarence G. 'Morse, Federal Maritime Administrator, to the Yale Law
Journal, Oct. 30, 1959, p. 2, on file in Yale Law Library [hereinafter cited as Letter
From the Maritime Administrator]. Bulk carriers are not eligible for subsidies. Ibid.
"In light of this wide cost differential [between American and foreign-flag ship opera-
tion,] it is an accepted fact that U.S.-flag ships cannot compete on equal terms with for-
eign-flag ships in foreign trade operations without operating-differential subsidy or some
other form of Government aid." Id. at 1. It has been estimated that the subsidy necessary
to keep the required amount of tonnage under the American flag would be $400 to $500
million yearly more than is now provided. American Committee for Flags of Necessity,
Some Important Facts About Flags of Necessity Ships-A Fleet Vital to America's
Defense And Economy Summary, p. 9 (2d ed. Selvage & Lee, Inc. [undated]).
2. See Summary of Oceangoing Vessels of 1,000 Gross Tons and Over Owned by
United States Companies and Their Affiliates and Registered Under Foreign Flags as of
June 30, 1959 [hereinafter cited as Summary of Oceangoing Vessels], attached to Letter
From the Maritime Administrator. Honduran and Venezuelan registry has also been used,
but the American-owned tonnage flying these flags is insignificant. See ibid. Costa Rica,
which had registered only a negligible number of American-owned vessels, may no longer
permit use of its flag as a "flag of convenience." See N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1958, p. 57,
col. 4; id., Nov. 16, 1958, § 1, p. 3, col. 6; DIRECrOR-GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
OFFICE, REPORTS, 1958--FLAG TRANSFER IN RELATION TO SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND SAFETY
6 (Int'l Labour Conf., 41st Sess. 1958). For attempts by other nations to attract flag-of-
convenience shipping, see N.Y. Times, May 27, 1958, p. 62, col. 6 (Lebanon); id., Oct.
30, 1958, p. 61, col. 4 (Tunisia).
3. Apparently, neither state has adopted legislation providing minimum standards of
maintenance or requiring periodic inspections. Legislation governing wages and working
conditions is very limited in scope. See GOLDBERG, THE MARITIME STo RY: A STUDY IN
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 220 (1958) [hereinafter cited as GoLnRaG]; INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONDITIONS IN SHIPS FLYING THE PANAMANIAN FLAG 37, 39
(1950). The relevant Panamanian legislation is reprinted in id. at 56-64, and in Berguido,
The Rights of Seamen on a Ship Under Panamaniai Registry, 19 TEMP. L.Q. 458, 460-
61 (1946). The small Panamanian consular corps would seem unable to enforce the few
existing provisions. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, op. cit. supra at 38.
4. "There shall be an initial registration fee of . . . one dollar twenty cents per net
ton, and there shall be an annual tonnage tax of ten cents per net ton, which taxes shall
not be increased during the term of twenty years counted from the date of initial regis-
tration." LIBERIA CODE tit. 22, § 53 (1956) ; see Hearings on Vessel Transfer, Trade-In,
and Reserve Fleet Policies Before the Subcommittee on the Merchant Marine of the
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nage was small ten years ago," now total over six million gross tons 7 and
represent approximately thirty-six per cent of all American privately owned s
and approximately five per cent of the world's, merchant tonnage.0 Flag-of-
convenience registry enables the American shipowner to halve his operating
costs 10 by avoiding requirements that American-flag vessels employ American
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 85th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 699
(1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Hearings]; S. REP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 72
(1950).
While the first widespread use of flags of convenience vas apparently to avoid the
limitations of the Neutrality Act at the outbreak of World War II, see 6 BEnEDIc,
ADMIRALTY 219-20 (7th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as BENEDIcr], the present use is for
economic reasons. The Maritime Administrator has listed the advantages of foreign trans-
fer as follows: (1) Increased market value of ship; (2) reduced cost of operation, par-
ticularly wages; (3) ability to operate in world trade with easy currency conversion;
(4) avoidance of U.S. Coast Guard requirements of vessel condition, cheapness of repairs
abroad; (5) tax savings; and (6) increased tonnage acquirable with the increased earn-
ings made available by delayed taxation. 1957 Hearings pt. 1, at 140; accord, S. RE.
No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1950).
5. This Comment will adopt the term "flag of convenience" since it is more widely
used, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1959, p. 54, col. 6; id., Jan. 4, 1959, § 5, p. 18, cal. 4, than
the term "flag of necessity" which is favored by shipowners, e.g., Memorandum From
the American Comm. for Flags of Necessity, Prepared by Donovan, Leisure, Newton &
Irvine, Esqs., to Dep't of State and General Counsel, National Labor Relations Bd., Oct.
30, 1959, or "runaway flag," favored by maritime unions, e.g., 1957 Hearings pt. 2, at
710 (statement of Executive Secretary of the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee).
6. As of January 3, 1950, 201 merchant vessels, totalling 1,745,048 gross tons, were
registered under the flags of Honduras, Liberia, and Panama although owned by United
States interests. See S. REP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1950).
7. See U.S. Maritime Administration, Statistics & Special Studies Office, Ship Data
Branch, Dep't of Commerce, Foreign Flag Vessels Under Effective Control as of July 1,
1959, Aug. 10, 1959 [hereinafter cited as Foreign Flag Vessels], attached to Letter From
the Maritime Administrator. This total is for the 518 ships under "effective" United
States control flying the flags of Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and Venezuela. United
States companies and their affiliates currently own 245 vessels of 1,000 gross tons and
over under those flags, totalling 3,529,623 gross tons. Stimnuary of Occangoing Vessels.
It appears that the remaining tonnage is accounted for by "vessels owned by foreign com-
panies, the stock of which is owned by American individuals." Letter From the Maritime
Administrator, p. 2.
United States companies and their affiliates have also registered 173 ships, totalling
1,923,549 gross tons, under other flags, particularly those of traditional maritime nations
such as Great Britain. See Summar, of Oceangoing Vessels.
8. In addition to 6,388,000 gross tons flying the flags of Panama, Liberia, Honduras
and Venezuela, see Foreign Flag Vessels, American private interests own 9,300,000 gross
tons under the American flag, see U.S. MAarrIm ADINVISTRATIO\, Dm'T oF CoUr.ERM
EMPLOY aENT REPORT OF ULM-D STATES-FLAG MERCHANT FI.LEE Oc O.gcIoNG VESSELS
1,000 GRoss ToNs AND OVER As OF JUNE 30, 1959, at 5 (1959), and 1,923,549 gross tons
under other flags, see Sunznar~y of Oceangoing Vessels.
9. As of June 30, 1958, the world's merchant fleet totalled 118,033,731 gross tons.
LLOYD'S REGISTER OF SHIPPING, STATISTICAL TABLES table 1 (1958).
10. See 1957 Hearinrgs pt. 1, at 142.
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seamen,1 either be repaired in American shipyards or pay a penalty tax of
fifty per cent of the value of repairs made abroad,12 and undergo periodic
Coast Guard inspections requiring high standards of maintenance.18 An
American flag-of-convenience operator-employing alien crews,1 4 perhaps
lowering maintenance standards, and effecting repairs abroad 1,-pays from
one-third to one-fifth of American wages 10 and reduces maintenance and
repair bills by about twenty-five per cent.' 7
Corporate tax savings furnish another incentive for flag-of-convenience
registry. Liberia refrains from taxing the earnings of corporations whose ves-
sels fly her flag and are not "exclusively engaged in coast-wise Liberian
trade."18 Moreover, the United States does not tax the earnings of vessel-
owning corporations chartered in certain other nations whose ships are docu-
mented there.19
Arrangements between the United States and the flag-of-convenience na-
tions 20 coupled with the statutory authority of the executive, during a na-
tional emergency, to requisition any vessel "owned by citizens of the United
States"'2' are designed to ensure control of American-owned flag-of-conven-
11. 49 Stat. 1935 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 672a(a) (b) (1952).
12. REv. STAT. § 3114 (1875), 19 U.S.C. § 257 (1958); see S. REP. No. 2494, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 73 (1950).
13. See 1957 Hearings pt. 1, at 140.
14. See Brief for Plaintiffs (affidavit), Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime
Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
15. The difference in repair cost estimates between United States and foreign ship-
yards, using Atlantic coast repair estimates as 100% is as follows: Belgium-54.60%;
Denmark-49.32%; France-65.58%; Germany-53.78% ; Italy-51.25%; Netherlands-
51.94%; Norway--64.16%; Sweden-57.98%; United Kingdom-55.04%. See Letter
From Maritime Administrator, p. 3.
16. See 1957 Hearings pt. 1, at 142; N.Y. Times, July 23, 1958, p. 54, col. 1; Brief
for Appellants, pp. 2-3, 'Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959).
See also American Committee for Flags of Necessity, Some Important Facts About Flags
of Necessity Ships-A Fleet Vital to America's Defense and Economy Summary, p. 14
(2d ed. Selvage & Lee, Inc. [undated]).
17. See 1957 Hearings pt. 1, at 142.
18. See LIimaA CoDE tit. 35, § 140(c) (1956).
19. See, e.g., Arrangement With Panama Respecting Relief From Double Income
Tax on Shipping Profits, Jan. 15, Feb. 8, March 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 1363, 1367, E:A.S. No.
221; Arrangement With Belgium for Reciprocal Relief From Double Income Tax on
Shipping Profits, Jan. 28, 1936, 49 Stat. 3871, E.A.S. No. 87.
Most of the large tanker fleets are now operated by Liberian corporations. See Brief
for Plaintiffs (affidavit), Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp.
416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
It has been argued that tax savings available to foreign shipowner corporations are the
prime cause of flag of convenience fleets. See 1957 Hearings pt. 2, at 699 (editorial in
Jan. 23, 1957, issue of The Shipping World and World Shipbuilding) ; N.Y. Times, Nov.
5, 1958, p. 70, col. 1. But it seems reasonable to assume that many American shipowners
would use flags of convenience even if only labor savings were to be gained by so doing.
20. See 1957 Hearings pt. 1, at 129.
21. 53 Stat. 1255 (1939), 46 U.S.C. § 1242 (1952).
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ience vessels if needed for defense purposes.2 2 These vessels now constitute
one-third of the total privately owned ships considered available for mobiliza-
tion by the Department of Defense.m Although some were built and initially
registered abroad 2 4 most were transferred from United States registry pur-
suant to the Shipping Act,25 which makes such transfer unlawful, except that
"approval may be accorded either absolutely or upon such conditions as the
Secretary [of Commerce] prescribes." 20 Under the rules promulgated by the
Maritime Administrator, to whom the Secretary has delegated his functions, -r
transfers are freely allowed to shipowners who contract to retain ultimate
American ownership and control and to make their ships available to the
Government in a national emergency.28
22. . . . [U]ntil such time as it may prove feasible for these American shipowners
to operate competitively under the United States flag, my Government retains its
interest in the continued operation of ships under foreign flags, including the PAN-
LIBHON registries. From our viewpoint there are important and valid defense
requirements which support this position.
Statement of Under Secretary of State Dillon to the Intergovernmental Shipping Con-
ference, held in Washington, D.C., June 1959, quoted in Memorandum From American
Comm- for Flags of Necessity, supra note 5, at 3; accord, Brief for Plaintiffs (affidavit),
p. 4, Afran Transp. Co. v. National 'aritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(letter from Mr. H. T. Merrill, Chief, Shipping Div., Dep't of State); N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1959, p. 46, col. 1 (statement by Vice Admiral R. E. Wilson). See also 1957
Hearings pt. 2, at 631-32 (statement of then Secretary of the Navy Gates).
The Maritime Administration has announced that it would provide United States Gov-
ernment war risk insurance or reinsurance of vessels flying the flags of Panama, Liberia,
and Honduras whose corporate owners were majority owned by United States citizens
and which had contracted "to make their vessels available to the United States, upon
request, in event of national emergency' See N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1959, p. 73, col. 1.
23. See Letter From the Maritime Administrator, p. 2.
"Mothball" ships are deemed inadequate for emergency requirements because they
must be extensively outfitted and reconditioned, a time consuming process, see S. REP.
No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1950) ; 1957 Hearings pt. 2, at 581, 602, 606-07, are
less modem than many flag of convenience vessels, comparc id. at 530 (most American
reserve vessels approximately 17 years old), uith U.S. BuFAzu OF THE CE.-sus, DEP'T
OF CommERcE, STATiSTIcAL A sTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATEs 600 (1959) (Liberian mer-
chant fleet has average age of 12 years), and would not provide sufficient tonnage, see
1957 Hearings pt. 2, at 608-09; N.Y. Times, April 18, 1959, p. 12, col 2.
24. From March 1955 to June 1956, American interests ordered 232 ships, totalling
6,560,835 deadweight tons, from foreign yards for operation under foreign flags. See 1957
Hearings pt. 2, at 698 (statement of Executive Secretary of AFL-CIO Maritime Com-
mittee).
25. Shipping Act of 1916, §§ 9, 37, 41, 39 Stat. 730, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 808,
835,839 (1952).
26. Shipping Act of 1916, § 41, added by 40 Stat. 902 (1918), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ 839 (1952). Supervisory powers originally given to the United States Shipping Board
were transferred to the United States Maritime Commission, then to the Secretary of
Commerce. See Note following 46 U.S.C. § 804 (1952).
27. See 16 Fed. Reg. 264243 (1951).
28. See 46 C.F.R. § 22L13 (1958). Penalties for breach of such contract provisions
are severe. See ibid.; Shipping Act of 1916, § 41, added by 40 Stat. 902 (1918), as
19601
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But United States maritime unions have actively opposed flag-of-conven-
ience registration.29 They point to the reduction in employment on American-
flag ships 8°0-from 158,860 in 1945, to 84,300 in 1951, to 51,640 in 1958 Ol-
and current unemployment of some 40,500 American seamen, 2 as proof that
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 839 (1952) (statutory authority for penalties including forfeiture
of the vessel and criminal penalties).
Approval was granted to transfer to foreign ownership and/or registry 354 privately
owned vessels, totalling 3,246,262 gross tons, in the five year period ending June 30, 1956.
280 of these vessels, comprising 91.% of the total tonnage were destined for Liberian or
Panamanian flags. 1957 Hearings pt. 1, at 78. From July 1, 1956, to March 15, 1957, 95
privately owned ships were approved for foreign registry transfer, 82 to Liberia alone.
Id. at 27.
29. "[Ilf worse comes to worse in the shipping industry it would be better to scrap
our ships than to transfer them to the runaway flags . . . ." 1957 Hearings pt. 2, at 710
(statement of Executive Secretary of the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee). "We favor
. . . any action directed to stop the foreign transfer of more American-flag ships." Id. at
714 (statement of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades
Dep't).
United States governmental support for flag-of-convenience shipping has also raised
diplomatic protest from European maritime nations. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1959, p. 66,
col. 1; id., June 9, 1959, p. 74, col. 5; id., June 14, 1959, § 1, p. 88, col. 1. Although wages
and operating costs of most American-owned flag-of-convenience vessels seem higher than
those on European-owned and -registered ships, see id., Nov. 26, 1958, p. 54, col. 5; S.
REP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1950), the traditional economic advantage of
European operators over their American competitors has been diminished, see N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1.958, p. 57, col. 4; id., March 28, 1958, p. 50, col. 5; id., Aug. 3, 1959,
p. 48, col. 2. In addition, the competitive position of the traditional European maritime
nations has been further undermined by non-American flag-of-convenience shipping, see
1957 Hearings pt. 2, at 694-95; N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1959, p. 48, col. 6.
Only the Soviet Union has discriminated against flag-of-convenience ships. See N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1958, § 5, p. 11, col. 1. See also id., March 23, 1958, § 5, p. 11, col. 5;
id., April 13, 1958, § 5, p. 11, col. 2. But similar action by other nations may be presaged
by the European-led attempt at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea to make international recognition of a vessel's nationality dependent upon the exist-
ence of a "genuine link" between the ship and the nation of registry. See MeDougal,
Burke & Vlasic, The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the Nationality of Ships,
Nov. 1959, pp. 32-34, 196-201 (manuscript in the Yale Law Library, to be published in the
Ainerican Journal of International Law for January 1960) (the proposal is of purely eco-
nomic origin and its implementation would constitute a departure from settled international
custom and prevent maximization of beneficial use of the seas) ; note 86 hinra.
30. See, e.g., 1957 Hearings pt. 2, at 715.
31. See U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, DEr'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AasTrAcr
OF THE UNITED STATES 596 (1959). Employment on American-flag vessels has dropped
almost continuously since the Korean war peak, and a net loss of 28,610 jobs has occurred
in the last ten years. Ibid. As of October 1, 1959, the estimated pool of licensed and un-
licensed seamen employed and available numbered 115,000 men; 66,785 seamen were em-
ployed on United States-flag privately owned or operated ships (including turnover), and
civil-service seamen on ships of the MSTS Nucleus Fleet (including turnover) numbered
7,688. See Letter From the Maritime Administrator, p. 5.
32. The estimated number of 40,527 seamen seeking employment includes 25,897 regis-
tered at the employment centers for unlicensed personnel of the National Maritime Union,
Seafarers International Union, and Sailors Union of the Pacific. Ibid.
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flag-of-convenience shipping is detrimental to American labor. They also
claim that growing numbers of flag-of-convenience vessels will depress pay
scales and working conditions on vessels still operated under the United States
flag by American crews.33 The unions have unsuccessfully sought legislation
to curtail transfers from United States to foreign registry and to limit the
ability of American operators to own or charter foreign-flag vessels.34 Perhaps
despairing of congressional assistance, the unions have commenced a policy of
sporadic picketing of flag-of-convenience vessels entering American ports and
have urged other unions to refuse to handle the cargo of such ships33 In
December of 1958, the American unions, as part of a world-wide anti-flag-of-
convenience campaign organized by the International Transport Worker's
Federation, picketed flag-of-convenience ships in ports throughout the country
for a period of four days.3 6 And more recently, the unions have attempted to
organize the crews of such vessels and to gain recognition as their bargain-
ing representatives.
37
APPLICABILITY OF THE WAGNER AND TAFT-HARTLEY ACTS TO LABOR
RELATIONS ON SHIPBOARD
To aid their organizational drive, the unions have contended that the Na-
tional Labor Relations (Wagner) Act and the Labor-Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act 3s should regulate employer-employee relations on board
flag-of-convenience ships 3 9 This contention rests upon a literal construction
33. See HoHIAN, IIsTORY OF AmIERcAw MERCHANT SE ,xr 115 (1956); Afran
Tramp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; Brief
for Appellants, p. 9, Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959).
34. See Hearings on S. 3823 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Comnwrce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 56, 59-61 (1950) ; 1957 Hear-
ings pt. 2, at 685, 715; Hearings on H.R. 6601, 7601, Before the Subcommnittee on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 211-15 (1959) (bill to eliminate subsidy
for American-flag operators who also operate foreign-flag vessels which compete with
an essential American-flag service).
35. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1958, p. 40, col. 1; NMU Pilot, Nov. 0, 1958, p. 3;
Seafarer's Log, Nov. 21, 1958, both reprinted in Brief for Plaintiffs exhibit "B" (affida-
vit), Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
36. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1958, p. 48, col. 8; id., Oct. 27, 1958, p. 53, col. 5; id., Dec.
2, 1958, p. 1, col. 2; id., Dec. 3, 1958, p. 73, col. 6; id., Dec. 4, 1958, p. 78, col. 1. While 129
ships were picketed in American ports, "outside the United States, the federation's efforts
appeared to be little more than a mediocre success." Id., Dec. 5, 1952, p. 62, col. 5.
37. See id., Nov. 19, 1959, p. 78, col. 4; id., Oct. 24, 1959, p. 42, col. 8; id., Oct.
22, 1959, p. 74, col. 8; id., Aug. 3, 1959, p. 48, col. 6; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. -.,
1959, p. 47, col 1.
38. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958).
39. Unions have brought representation proceedings in the following flag-of-conven-
ience cases: Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1958); Eastern Ship.
ping Corp., 44 L..R.M. 1571 (NLRB, Sept. 21, 1959); West India Fruit & S.S. Co.,
No. 15-CA-1454, NLRB, complaint issued April 15, 1959 (see note 78 in ra and accom-
panying text) ; Compania Maritima Sansoc, Ltd., 2 CCH LA& L REP. 10031 (4th ed.
1950). The NLRB has, of course, jurisdiction over labor relations on American flag ships.
4 BENEDICr 245 (7th ed. 1958) ; see NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
1960]
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of the acts' jurisdictional provisions, which give the NLRB power to resolve
"questions of representation" and to prevent "unfair labor practices" when
"commerce" is affected. 40 Commerce is defined to include that "between any
foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia."41
Hence, only ships which never enter United States ports are specifically ex-
cluded from the acts' coverage. In regard to land enterprises, these all-en-
compassing jurisdictional grants have been interpreted to cover labor relations
in the plants or offices of foreign corporations located within the United
States,42 even when their work forces are alien.
43
But application of American statutes to labor relations on board foreign
oceangoing vessels only transitorially in United States waters presents differ-
ent problems and must be considered in light of principles of international
law. Under settled doctrine, ports and adjacent waters are within the sover-
eign territory of the coastal state,44 which may, therefore, prohibit access by
foreign vessels or permit entry only on such conditions as it may choose to
impose.45 The absolute power of the coastal state is tempered, however, by
the demands of comity among nations, which require it to exercise a high
degree of self-restraint, particularly in matters involving the "internal econ-
omy" of a foreign vessel.
40
40. National Labor Relations Act §§ 9(c) (1), 10(a), as amended, 61 Stat. 144, 146
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1958).
41. National Labor Relations Act § 2(6), as amended, 61 Stat. 138, 29 U.S.C. § 152
(1958).
42. See Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 118 N.L.R.B. 1327 (1957); Delta Match
Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1953).
43. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 1.18 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1957).
44. A vessel is not viewed as the sovereign territory of any state. See Scharrenberg
v. Dollar S.S. Co., 245 U.S. 122 (1917) (alternative holding). Therefore, the principles
governing extraterritorial application of United States statutes seem inapposite to the
problem of applying the labor acts on board foreign-flag vessels. But see Memorandum
From American Comm. for Flags of Necessity, supra note 5, at 9-14, citing Foley Bros.
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949), which involved application of American law in foreign
countries.
45. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (dictum) (Mar-
shall, C.J.) ; BRIGGS, LAW OF NATIONS 348 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as BRICGs] ;
2 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL. LAW § 1.12, at 1-2 (1941) [hereinafter cited
as HACKWORTH]; JEsSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 191
(1927) [hereinafter cited as JEssuP]; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 460-61 (8th
ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]; U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Report-Convention on the TerritorWal Sea and the Contiguous Zone pt. 1, § I, art. 1,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958). But see COLOmBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE SEA 129 (3d rev. ed. 1.954) [hereinafter cited as CoLOmxos] (coastal states required
during peacetime to keep their ports open to foreign shipping).
46. . . . [I]t was found long ago that it would be beneficial to commerce if the local
government would abstain from interfering with the internal discipline of the ship,
and the general regulation of the rights and duties of the officers and crew towards
the vessel or among themselves. And so by comity it came to be generally under-
stood among civilized nations that all matters of discipline and all things done on
board which affected only the vessel or those belonging to her, and did not involve
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In determining whether to exercise its sovereign prerogatives, the coastal
state must consider its self-interest shared with other nations-an "inclusive"
interest-in free commercial navigation in addition to the local interests which
it seeks to protect by exercise of jurisdiction-its "exclusive" interests-and
the exclusive interests of foreign states.47 Regulation which constitutes an un-
reasonable interference with the internal economy of foreign ships may evoke
defensive exercise of jurisdiction by other coastal states, thus subjecting ocean-
going vessels to different laws in every port. For example, if a coastal state
required that every vessel entering its waters employ a crew consisting entire-
ly of the coastal state's nationals, other states might be forced to respond by
comparable legislation, and mutually beneficial world trade would be brought
to a virtual standstill.
In addition to this unfavorable impact on a coastal state's inclusive interest
in international commerce, any substantial exercise of its jurisdiction may in-
terfere with the exclusive interests of foreign states. A vessel may be the locus
of diverse exclusive national interests which can be adversely affected by
coastal regulation. The flag state, whose law is recognized as governing the
internal economy and order of the vessel,48 has an interest in protecting the
vessel 49 and requisitioning it in wartime,"0 and may be heavily dependent on
the revenue produced -by the registration fees which it is entitled to collect.51
The state or states of which the ultimate owners of the vessel are citizens
have an interest in protecting their nationals' investments.5 2 The state in
which the corporate owner of the vessel is incorporated has an interest in the
the peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquility of the port, should be left by
the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which
the vessel belonged ....
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887) (dictum); see The Ester, 190 Fed. 216, 221
(E.D.S.C. 1911); RESTATEMENT, FOREIG" RELATIONS LAW § 34 (1958). CoL0.o-os §§
285-86; 1 OPPENHEm 503; 2 HAC WoiTH § 140, at 209; RomxisoN, ADSuuALTY LAW iN
THE UmTED STATES § 28 (1939).
47. See 1 OPpFNHEu §§ 142, 257. See generally McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the
Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives Versuis National Egoism, 67 YA LJ. 539
(1958).
4& See St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 152 (1894); CoLomos 222-23; Braces
339-41; 1 OPPENHErM § 264; Ri~ow, THE TEST OF THE NATIONAuTY OF A MERCHANT
VEssE. 5 (1937) [hereinafter cited as RIENow]; 32 Ops. Aney GEN. 332-35 (1920).
49. See 2 HAcxwoRrH § 214; McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, supra note 29, at 82-87.
See also 68 Stat. 883 (1954), 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-76 (1958). In addition, the flag state may
confer upon its vessels commercial benefits secured by treaty. See RiExow 3-4; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, art. xc, 54 Stat. 1745,
T.S. No. 956. "
50. See Rmnow 7; -McNair, The Requiitioning of Merchant Ships, 27 J. CoUP. LEG.
& INT'L L. (3d ser.) .pts. 3 & 4 at 68, 71-78 (1945); McDougal, Burke & Vasic, supra
note 29, at 93-96.
51. See N.Y. Times, April 6, 1958, p. 78, col. 1 (fees are 13% of Liberian national
budget).
52. This interest may enable a state to afford the vessel protection even though she is
registered elsewhere. See Rmiow 104-05; 2 HAcHwoRTH § 214, 757-58. But iee 1 O PE-
Trrn 592.
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prosperity of that corporation, even if the stockholders are aliens, since it is a
potential source of tax revenue. If the vessel is under charter (particularly a
bareboat charter), the state of which the charterer is a national--and perhaps
also the state of which the stockholders of a chartering corporation are na-
tionals-has an interest in protecting its nationals' investments in the charter
party. The state in which the crew was recruited has an interest in ensuring
the continued employment of persons drawn from its labor pool, and the states
of which the crew members are citizens have an interest in protecting their
nationals. Undue interference by a coastal state with any or several of these
interests by disturbing the status quo on shipboard would risk retaliation
against the coastal state's own shipping or other interests potentially subject
to foreign jurisdiction. 53
This concurrence of an inclusive interest with various exclusive foreign in-
terests has led the United States to display considerable restraint in exercis-
ing jurisdiction over foreign-flag vessels. Criminal jurisdiction has been as-
serted only when the "peace and tranquility" of the port is considered
threatened.54 And, with few exceptions, civil jurisdiction has been exercised
only to provide reasonable protection of interests which are widely recognized
as reasonable concerns of all coastal states: collecting fees and taxes for port
usage,55 enforcing port safety regulations,"0 protecting the health and welfare
of United States residents-primarily by customs," health,"' and security 51
laws, and regulating health and safety conditions on ,board vessels carrying
passengers,60 many of whom are United States nationals or immigrants to this
country. The Supreme Court has recognized the demands of comity by a fic-
53. See Romero v. Terminal Operating Corp., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959) ; Lauritzen
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582, 592-93 (1953).
54. See Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) ; BRIGGS 350-53; 2 HACtWORTH § 140;
COLOMBOS §§ 279, 284; Jassup 145-82; RIxzow ch. IX. As to what actions "threaten the
peace of the port," see RESTATEmENT, FOREIGN RELAvioNs LAW § 34, comment b (1958).
But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2274, 2275 (1958) (defense measures do not require the port's peace
to be breached). These statutes make it a crime to tamper with the "motive power" or
destroy any private vessel, of American or foreign registry, in United States waters. For
convictions under earlier versions of these statutes, see Polonio v. United States, 131 F.2d
679 (9th Cir. 1942); Giugni v. United States, 127 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1942); Bersio v.
United States, 124 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1941). All involved Italian crewmen damaging their
ships at the outbreak of World War II on orders from the Italian Government.
55. See REv. STAT. § 4219 (1875), 46 U.SC. § 121 (1952) ; REV. STAT. § 4225 (1875),
46 U.S.C. § 128 (1952).
56. See Rav. STAT. § 4472 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 170 (1952). Enactment of port safety
rules is largely left to the discretion of local state and Coast Guard officials. See 62 Stat.
249 (1948), 33 U.S.C. § 157 (1952) ; 26 Stat. 328 (1890), 33 U.S.C. § 147b (1952).
57. See 46 Stat. 747 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1958) ; REv. STAT. §§ 4197, 4200 (1875),
46 U.S.C. §§ 91, 92 (1952).
58. See 58 Stat. 705 (1944), 42 U.S.C. § 269 (1952). See also 66 Stat. 219 (1952), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1281-87 (1958) (entry, discharge, and medical treatment in this country, of alien
crews on foreign flag vessels regulated).
59. See Note, 28 TaMP. L.Q. 230 (1954).
60. See 22 Stat. 186 (1882), 46 U.S.C. §§ 151-56a (1952) ; Rv. STAT. § 4400 (1875),
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 362 (1.952).
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tion that all merchant vessels have an implied consent to enter United States
ports."' This consent can be made subject to conditions, the Court has held,
only by statutory language which puts foreign vessels on notice prior to their
entering American waters.02 Such language has seldom 'been found in statutes
which arguably constitute major regulations of the management of foreign
vessels.63 Congress has interfered with employer-employee relations on foreign
vessels through four interrelated statutes "-the "Seamen's Wage" acts--
apparently enacted to reduce foreign shipowners' competitive advantage by
indirectly forcing them to pay higher wages.0 5 The most important 0 0 was
61. See Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 178 (1903) ; The Schooner Exchange,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
62. A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might
not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exer-
cise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received
obligations of the civilized world....
If, for reasons of state, the ports of a nation ... be closed against ... vessels of
any particular nation, notice is usually given of such determination.
Id. at 136, 140; accord, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957) ; Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) ; Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100, 132 (1923) (dissenting opinion).
63. Compare Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857) (patent laws not
applicable on board foreign vessel) ; Petition of Canadian Pac. Ry., -278 Fed. 180 (W.D.
Wash. 1921) (statute requiring that 75% of crew be able to understand orders in language
in which they are given inapplicable) ; United States v. Ah Fook, 183 Fed. 33 (9th Cir.
1910) (immigration laws), and United States ex rel. Anderson v. Burke, 99 Fed. 895
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1899) (same), with Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (18th
Amendment and National Prohibition Act, barring the "importation" of intoxicating liquors
into "the United States and all territories subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage
purposes" held to prohibit ships' stores of liquor on foreign-flag vessels in United States
waters).
64. REV. STAT. § 4527 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 594 (1952) (seaman discharged without
fault must be paid one month's wages even if not yet earned), Vlavianos v. The Cypress,
171 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 924 (1949) (applicable to foreign sea-
men on foreign-flag vessel) ; REv. STAT. § 4529 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1952) (provision
for immediate payment of seaman after discharge of cargo or of seaman), The Sonderborg,
40 F.2d 652 (E.D. Va. 1930), aff'd, 47 F.2d 723 (4th Cir.), cert. denied mib noin. Ukties,
Dampsldbeselskabet Donnenborg v. lfikkelsen, 284 U.S. 618 (1931) (applicable to foreign
seamen on foreign-flag vessel) ; REv. STAT. § 4530 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1952) (seamen
entitled at every port to part of wages earned but unpaid), Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon,
252 U.S. 348 (1920) (applicable to foreign seamen on foreign-flag vessels) ; 23 Stat. 55
(1884), 46 U.S.C. § 599 (1952) (wage advances to seamen unlawful), Heros v. Cockinos,
177 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1949) (applicable to advances made in U.S. waters to foreign sea-
men on foreign-flag vessels) ; see 6 Bamiaocr 147-48 (7th ed. 1958). See generally GuLI-
BERG 71. See also 66 Stat 223 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1286 (1958) (illegal to discharge alien
seaman in the United States without prior approval of Attorney General).
65. See HRR. REP. No. 645, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1912); BIcKE., TaE U.NPULusnE
OPINIONS OF "MR. JusTicE BRANDEIS 47-50 (1957) (unpublished opinion of Brandeis, J.,
in Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920)). But see GOLDBRE ch. 3 (Congress
intended only to protect seamen).
66. Ray. STAT. § 4530 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1952).
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designed to enable dissatisfied alien seamen to jump ship in American ports
by giving them the right to collect part of the wages they had already earned
immediately, irrespective of the terms of their articles of employment. But
applying this legislation, which contains the requisite specificity, to vessels fly-
ing foreign flags is not precedent for applying the American labor acts aboard
foreign ships. Even under the "Seamen's Wage" statutes, attempts to exclude
advance payments made in foreign ports from the amount due were blocked
by the Court for lack of specific expression of congressional intent.67
In light of these principles and precedents, insufficient congressional au-
thorization exists to extend the labor acts' coverage to all foreign vessels call-
ing at United States ports and thus to expose the bulk of the world's ship-
ping to American union organizing efforts. 68 The NLRB has, therefore, re-
fused to hear cases involving shipowner-crew relations on board foreign-flag
vessels owned by foreigners. Compania Maritima Sansc, Ltd.69 affirmed dis-
missal of a representation petition on the ground that the "internal economy
of a vessel of foreign registry and ownership was involved."70 Neither the
crew, nor the corporate owner of the Panamanian-flag vessel, nor the majority
of its stockholders, were American.71 On analogous facts, the NLRB's Gen-
eral Counsel recently refused to issue a complaint against an alleged employer
unfair labor practice. 72
67. See Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918); Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes,
275 U.S. 463 (1928). By advancing money in foreign ports, often to the employment agent,
the shipowners could reduce wages due seamen when they reached America. See BICKEL,
op. cit. supra note 66, at 54-55. Legislation designed to avoid this construction of the ad-
vance-payment statute by explicitly applying it to payments made abroad was bitterly pro-
tested by foriegn governments, and failed to be enacted. See BRIGGS 353; Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
38 Stat. 1169 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 672(a) (1952), provides that "no vessel of 100 gross
tons and upward.., shall be permitted to depart from any port of the United States unless
she has on board a crew of not less than 75% of which, in each department thereof, arc
able to understand any order given by the officers of such vessel . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
This statute has been held inapplicable to foreign vessels. See Petition of Canadian Pac.
Ry., 278 Fed. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
68. No legislative history exists indicating that Congress ever considered whether the
labor acts should apply to such vessels. The few relevant remarks indicate that Congress
was concerned only with the American workingmen. See H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
lst Sess. 4 (1947) (remarks of Representative Hartley) ; 75 CONG. REc. 5465 (1932) (re-
marks of Representative Dyer) ; 75 id. at 5482 (remarks of Representative Blanton). See
also 22 C.F.R. § 81.12 (1958) ("United States citizens employed on foreign vessels ...
have no claim ... to the special protection, in matters relating to their employment, which
the laws of the United States afford seamen employed on vessels of the United States.").
69. Compania Maritima Sansoc, Ltd., 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. 10081 (4th ed. 1950) ;, see
Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 561 (1950) (subsequent case).
70. 2 CCH LAB. L. RP,. at 10262.
71. Although the crew was wholly alien, many seamen were recruited and signed
articles of employment in the United States.
72. 44 L.R.R.M. 1363 (NIIRB July 13, 1959). The case differs slightly from Sansoc
since the articles of employment were executed abroad.
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These decisions find support in Benc v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 73
decided by the Supreme Court in 1957. There, a dispute over wages and
working conditions erupted on shipboard between the wholly alien crew and
the captain of a Liberian-flag vessel docked in Portland harbor, and Ameri-
can unions picketed in support of the crew. The vessel was owned by a Li-
berian corporation, whose stockholders were apparently not Americans.74 The
Court held, 7 to 1, that the NLRB did not have exclusive jurisdiction to grant
relief from the picketing and that the federal court was therefore free to award
damages as provided by state common law. The Court discussed the issue as
being whether the labor acts applied to the shipowner-crew dispute ;7 the
cases cited by the Court and on which it relies involve the application of
various United States statutes on board foreign-flag vessels.70 And even were
the issue framed in terms of remedies against picketing,77 the absence of e.-
clusive NLRB jurisdiction over this shoreside activity would seem to pre-
clude regulation on shipboard since the latter would result in greater inter-
ference with the -internal economy of the vessel.
In two -recent NLRB cases, however, decisions involving foreign-ovned
flag-of-convenience vessels have been distinguished and the American labor
statutes have been applied on board American-owned flag-of-convenience ves-
sels. In West India Fruit & S.S. Co., currently pending before the Board, 8
the General Counsel authorized issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint
against an American corporation which owned and operated a Liberian-flag
vessel manned by a wholly alien crew.7 0 In PeninsMdar & Occidental S.S.
Co.,"' the Board accepted jurisdiction over representation proceedings on
board two Liberian-flag vessels. The Liberian corporate owners were wholly
owned subsidiaries of an American corporation, which operated the vessels
under bareboat charter. Some of the crew were American citizens or resident
aliens, and most of the crew had been recruited and had signed articles of
employment in the United States.
These rulings were probably not premised on a theory that the vessels in-
volved were of American nationality, and therefore subject to United States
legislation equally with American-flag ships.8 ' The United States, in commer-
73. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
74. See Record, p. 46.
75. 353 U.S. at 142-43.
76. The Court cited Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) ; Brown v. Duc-
hesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857) ; and the "Seamen's Wage"' cases, see notes 64-67
supra. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887), concerning the exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion over foreign flag vessels in American ports, was also cited.
77. See notes 125-215 infra and accompanying text.
78. The case is "now under consideration and awaiting final determination by the
Board." Letter From Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, NLRB, to the Yale Law Journal,
Oct. 13, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library.
79. See ibid.; N.Y. Times, April 16, 1959, p. 65, col. 6.
80. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1958).
81. "No assertion by a State that a vessel belongs to itself because the owners are of
its nationality, has succeeded." Rmxow W7.
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cial treaties with a number of states, including the flag-of-convenience nations
Liberia and Honduras, has obligated itself to recognize the documents and
maritime flags of these states as conclusive of the nationality of vessels bear-
ing them.8 2 Thus, American courts and the NLRB are barred from denying
the foreign nationality of these vessels, despite underlying United States in-
terests in them. Moreover, according to settled international law, a vessel
possesses only one nationality 83 which the maintenance of international public
order and navigation require to 'be readily ascertainable.8 4 Registration, as
shown by the ship's documents and flag, is the only means ,by which nation-
ality may be so ascertained. Therefore, a vessel's registration is universally
determinative; all nations are bound once any state has unilaterally attributed
its nationality to a vessel.8 5 An attempt to substitute for registration a less
objective test of nationality would founder on a diversity of interpretations-
each probably based upon the interpreting state's exclusive interests--and
could result in the disruption of mutually advantageous commerce.80
Nor do cases applying the Jones Act 8 7 to tort actions by aliens against
foreign-flag shipowners 88 support, as some would argue,89 the Board's appli-
82. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938,
art. xv, 54 Stat. 1739, T.S. No. 956; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights
With Honduras, Dec. 7, 1927, art. x, 45 Stat. 2625, T.S. No. 964.
83. See RiENow 13-15; BRIGGS 330; CoLomilos 216. No state may grant registration to
a ship concurrently registered in another country. See I OPPENHEIM 595; RIENow 219;
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Report-Convention on the High Seas art. 6,
cl. 2, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.54 & Add 1 (1958).
84. See McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the
Nationality of Ships, Nov. 1959, pp. 2, 76, 111-12.
85. See RIENow 218; BRIGGS 331; COLOMBOs 216.
86. See McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, supra note 84, at 5-9, 19-20, 32-34.
Hence, the recent United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea rejected a proposed
text, put forward by opponents of flag-of-convenience shipping, which unequivocally stated
that recognition of a vessel's nationality requires a "genuine link" between the vessel and
the flag state. See REiFF, THE UNITED STATES AND THE TREATY LAW OF T1lE SEA 243
(1959). "Genuine link" was not defined. Instead, the Conference meeting in Geneva on
April 29, 1958, adopted a Convention on the High Seas, article 5 of which reads as follows:
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine
link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise
its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flags.
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.54 & Add 1 (1958). The Conference thus affirmed the pre-
rogative of any state to fix the conditions of registry and altered the text so as to obscure
the significance of "genuine link." For citation to writings by the article's supporters, and
for criticism of the article, see McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, Supra at 5-36.
87. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
88. E.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Gain-
bera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 742 (1943). See GIL-
MORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 388 (1957) ; Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising Out of
Foreign Flag Operations, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 295, 310-12 (1959) (discussing cases).
89. See Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416, 425 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958).
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cation of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts on board American-owned flag-
of-convenience vessels. The Jones Act, by its terms, is applicable to any sea-
man injured in the course of his employment ;O0 its coverage therefore seems
literally as broad as that of the labor acts. Claims under the Jones Act are
allowed in United States courts against owners of foreign-flag vessels when-
ever there are sufficient American "contacts"--such as nationality of owners,
situs of injury, country of recruitment or signing of the seamen, nationality
or residence of the seamen, and the home port of the vessel 1-a test com-
parable to that articulated by the NLRB in flag-of-convenience cases.02 But
courts have extended Jones Act recovery to the crews of foreign-flag vessels
on the assumption that a different measure of personal injury recovery does
not interfere with the internal economy of the vessel.03 Hence, usurpation of
applicable tort law does not have an impact on the principles of comity com-
parable to application of the labor acts. And special humanitarian considera-
tions may motivate a court to allow speedy recovery, under American law,
to seamen convalescing in the United States and lacking ready access to a
forum in the flag state.94 In addition, the courts have been particularly aware
of the potential retaliation and disruption of international trade deriving from
an over-extension of Jones Act coverage,05 a fact that underscores the impor-
tance of these factors in limiting the jurisdictional scope of the labor statutes.
On the other hand, the argument that applying American labor legislation
on board American-owned flag-of-convenience vessels flying Liberian, Hon-
duran, and -Costa Rican flags runs counter to provisions in United States con-
sular and commercial treaties with those nations does not seem meritorious."
90. 41 Stat 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
91. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). Compare Airline Stewards v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 369, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (criteria for determining
whether the Railway Labor Act should be applied to foreign commerce).
Two recent opinions, Batholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1959) and Bobolakis v. Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A., 163 F. Supp.
236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), apparently overruling Mproumeriotis v. Seacrest Shipping Co., 149
F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) and Argyros v. Polar Compania De Navegacion, Ltda., 146
F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), indicate that underlying American stock ownership is a
sufficient contact.
92. See notes 109-10 infra and accompanying text. Compare Fianza Cia. Nay. S.A. v.
Benz, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 66733 (D. Ore. 1958) (Issue of existence of labor dispute between
picketing American union on shore and shipowner: "... [W]hat flag any given bottom
carries is not of importance. The question is: Who are the true owners, the true operators
and the true charterers .... ").
93. .... [M]atters of 'internal management' are not involved in an action by a seaman
to recover damages for injuries suffered through the negligence of the shipowner." Ger-
radin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1932) (A.N. Hand, J.).
94. See Giumoan & BLAcK, ADma.ArY 390-91 (1957).
95. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
96. See Memorandum From the American Committee for Flags of Necessity, Prepared
by Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, Esqs., to Dep't of State & General Counsel, Na-
tional Labor Relations Bd., Oct. 30, 1959, pp. 100-18. The treaties involved are: Treaty of
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Consular and commercial treaties, which have been broadly construed in favor
of aliens claiming rights under them,97 are self-executing and have the force
of congressional enactments.98 Although Taft-Hartley was enacted subsequent
to the treaties with the flag-of-convenience states, Congress expressed no in-
tent to alter them, and similar treaties signed since enactment of Taft-Hart-
ley 9 contain no reservations indicating that the act restricts rights under
them. It would therefore seem proper to conclude that Congress intended no
construction of the labor statutes inconsistent with provisions of these
treaties. 100
But NLRB jurisdiction over activities on 'board American-owned flag-of-
convenience vessels does not appear to conflict with these treaties. The con-
sular treaty with Liberia provides:
A consular officer shall have exclusive jurisdiction over controversies
arising out of the internal order of private vessels of his country, and
shall alone exercise jurisdiction in cases, wherever arising, between of-
ficers and crews, pertaining to the enforcement of discipline on board,
provided the vessel and the persons charged with wrongdoing shall have
entered a port within his consular district. Such an officer shall also havejurisdiction over issues concerning the adjustment of wages and the ex-
ecution of contracts relating thereto provided, however, that such juris-
diction shall not exclude the jurisdiction conferred on local authorities
under existing or future laws.1' 1
Interpretation of "controversies arising out of the internal order" seems
limited to disciplinary matters between captain and crew, 102 relatively minor
crimes on shipboard, 103 and suits by seamen for certain wage claims. 10' The
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, 54 Stat. 1739, T.S. No.
956; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights With Honduras, Dec. 7, 1927,
45 Stat. 2618, T.S. No. 964; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With
Costarica, July 10, 1851, 10 Stat. 18, T.S. No. 62; Convention Respecting Consular Officers
With Liberia, Oct. 7, 1938, 54 Stat. 1751, T.S. No. 957.
97. See, e.g., Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) ; Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332 (1924) ; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
98. See Jordan v. Tashiro, supra note 97; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 703-06
(1887) (dissenting opinion of Field, J.) ; BRIGGS 886, 888 (distinction between self-execut-
ing and non-self-executing treaties).
99. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With the Italian Re-
public, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965.
100. The Supreme Court has consistently tried to avoid construing statutes and treaties
as contradicting, and thus limiting, one another. See, eg., Cook V. United States, 288 U.S.
102, 120 (1933) (Court held that a treaty with Great Britain was not abrogated by the
Tariff Act of 1930) ; United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496
(1883).
101. Convention Respecting Consular Officers'With Liberia, Oct. 7, 1938, art. x, para.
1, 54 Stat. 1751, T.S. No. 957.
102. See, e.g., The Wind, 22 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1938). Compare The Binna, 1938
Am. Mar. Cas. 682 (S.D. Tex. 1938), with The Marchen Maersk, 1937 Am. Mar. Cas.
1531 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
103. See Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
104. See Papadakis v. S.S. Virginia, 1948 Am. Mar. Cas. 1721 (E.D. Va. 1948) (claims
for advances on prior voyages are matters of internal economy).
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clause has never successfully been invoked to restrict the jurisdictional scope
of United States legislation falling beyond such narrow areas. And the con-
cluding clauses of the first sentence refer specifically to matters of "discipline"
and "wrongdoing" in cases between "officers and crew."105 In addition, e-x-
clusive consular jurisdiction over "issues concerning the adjustment of wages
and the execution of contracts relating thereto" is explicitly made concurrent
with applicable laws of the United States. Hence, the treat), would seem to
have no bearing on the intended scope of the labor acts, which cover matters
over which consuls are not accorded exclusive jurisdiction. The commercial
treaty with Liberia grants to Liberian nationals "equally with those of the
most-favored nation ... liberty freely to come with their vessels" into United
States ports and territorial waters.1 0 It is, therefore, not the vessel herself
that is protected by this article. Nevertheless, corporations formed under
Liberian law and owning ships which fly the Liberian flag, even when their
stockholders are Americans, would come within this clause since the ships are
"their vessels." But, although it could be argued that exercise of NLRZB juris-
diction erects an inhibitory if not prohibitory barrier to entry and therefore
infringes "liberty freely to come," the clause seems primarily designed to ban
discriminatory regulation of port usage and discriminatory pilotage or port
fees. 10 7 Another article of the commercial treaty provides that Liberian ves-
sels shall "in all respects and unconditionally be accorded the same treatment
as" the vessels of the United States.108 Since all American-flag ships are sub-
ject to American labor statutes, this article would not seem to bar application
of the acts to flag-of-convenience vessels. While it might be argued that the
change in labor relations which application of the acts would cause on board
foreign-flag vessels-a change which would not occur on American-flag ships
-violates this clause, the change does not result from any difference in treat-
ment of the vessels by the United States Government.
Moreover, selective application of the labor statutes on the basis of ultimate
American ownership is less in conflict with the principles of comity than ap-
plication of the acts to all foreign vessels. Application to a smaller number of
ships reduces the burden on the free flow of cormnerce and thus constitutes a
lesser interference with the inclusive interests of all states, including the United
States. Limited application also minimizes the interference with exclusive in-
105. Cf. REv. STAT. § 4079 (1875), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 256 (1958).
106. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With the Republic of Liberia,
Aug. 8, 1.938, art. vu, 54 Stat. 1739, 1742, T.S. No. 956. Substantially the same clauses ap-
pear in treaties with Honduras and Costa Rica. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Consular Rights With Honduras, Dec. 7, 1927, art. vu, 45 Stat. 2618, 26-, T.S. No. 964;
Treaty of Friendship, lCommerce, and Navigation With the Republic of Costarica, July
10, 1851, art. 11, 10 Stat. 18, 19, T.S. No. 62.
107. See 6 BENDIcr 50 (7th ed. 1958) ; HAwxINs, CoummcIAL TREATIEs AND AGREm-
MrENrs: PRINCIPLES AND PRAcncE 34 (1951); HEROD, FAvoRW NATION TREATMENT: AN
AxALYsis OF THE MOST FAvoRED NATION CLAUSE 36 (1901).
108. -Art. xiv, 54 Stat. at 1745. No comparable provision exists in the treaties with
Honduras and Costa Rica.
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terests of foreign states, thereby lessening the risk of retaliation against Ameri-
can interests. And American ownership diminishes the extent to which ex-
clusive foreign interests in a vessel are invaded.
Nonetheless, selective application of the acts on the basis of factors less ob-
jective than registry might lead to undue uncertainty for ship operators, who
would be unable to ascertain in advance of entering United States waters
whether their relationship with their crews would be subjected to NLRB
jurisdiction. The Labor Board's failure in Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co.
to indicate which of the many factors it cited-such as the nationality of the
underlying owners, 0 9 place of recruitment of seamen, and their nationality-
are indispensable to application of the acts,"10 manifests this problem. Asser-
tion of NLRB jurisdiction on the basis of obscure and unspecified criteria
does violence to the Supreme Court's traditional and desirable rule that for-
eign-flag vessels should not be subject to conditions of entry without un-
equivocal prior notice.
More important, principles of comity would seem to proscribe even selective
exercise of NLRB jurisdiction. Application of American labor laws would
have a far-reaching impact upon the internal economy of a vessel by enabling
an American union to organize her crew. After a successful representation
election under NLRB auspices, the union could become the crew's bargain-
ing agent, and the shipowner would thereafter have a duty to bargain with
it in good faith and to refrain from committing any unfair labor practices.
Since the crew's terms or conditions of employment would be covered 'by
existing articles, forcing new terms or conditions prior to the end of the voy-
age would probably be a mutinous act."' But the crew could demand higher
wages and better working conditions at the termination of the voyage Nwhen
its articles of employment expired. Discharge of crew members by the ship-
owner in an attempt to resist these demands would constitute an unfair labor
practice." 2
Further, by regulating the internal economy of foreign-flag ships, applica-
tion of American labor legislation to flag-of-convenience vessels would dis-
place the labor relations policies of the flag states.1 3 The failure of Liberia
109. Uncertainty as to this criterion would not exist in the case of transferred vessels,
since the Maritime Administration's requirement of continued American ownership would
make a prescription of such ownership plausible. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
But cf. Fianza CGa. Nav. S.A. v. Benz, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 66733 (D. Ore. 1958) (presump-
tion of foreign ownership).
110. See 120 N.L.R.B. at 1.101 n1.7.
111. Cf. Rees v. United States, 95 F.2d 784,.792 (4th Cir. 1938) (indictment for revolt
by seamen on United-States-flag ship while in harbor in Uruguay).
112. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
113. See Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia. Nav. S.A., 162 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (refusal to apply Panamanian labor legislation to labor relations on board Liberian-
flag vessels owned by Panamanian corporations, on the ground that the law of the flag state
-not that of the owner-should be applied absent contractual stipulation to the contrary);
Grivas v. Alianza Compania Armadora, 150 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (same).
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and Panama to enact extensive labor legislation for their flag ships 14 is an
expression of a policy to leave shipowner-crew relations to private parties.
Pursuant to this policy, the vessels are manned under articles of employment,
many of them customary European articles which conform to standards estab-
lished by -international convention," 56 governing all aspects of working con-
ditions and wages.116 Moreover, application of the American labor statutes to
activities on flag-of-convenience ships on the basis of American ownership
would logically lead to their application on board the large number of Ameri-
can-owned ships flying European flags;11 indeed, failure so to apply the acts
would seem inconsistent with the nondiscrimination clause of commercial
treaties with the flag-of-convenience states Liberia and Honduras. 18 These
European-flag vessels are governed by extensive labor legislation 110 which
may provide for administrative control of the bargaining process, prescribe
exclusive rights and remedies available to the shipowners and crews, regulate
the internal affairs of unions representing the crews, and may favor the unions
and seamen of the flag state.
No expression of congressional intent exists thus to invade the internal
economy of flag-of-convenience vessels.' -° And, since even American-oned
114. See note 3 supra.
115. The Seamen's Articles of Agreement Convention was adopted at the International
Labor Conference, 9th Session, at Geneva on June 24, 1926, and became effective on July
7, 1938. Most of the maritime nations of Europe have adopted this convention, which reg-
ulates the terms and effects, and interpretation of seamen's articles. See 6A BzrEricr 647
(7th ed. 1958). A detailed, far reaching convention is the Convention No. 92, Concerning
Crew Accommodation on Board Ship, adopted by the International Labor Organization
at its 32d Session in Geneva, June 8, 1949. The convention became effective Jan. 29, 1953,
and most of the maritime nations of Europe are signatories. The United States is not,
apparently on the premise that its existing regulations "equal or exceed" those of the con-
vention. See 6 id. at 133. Convention No. 93, Concerning Wages, Hours of Work on Board
Ship, and Manning, adopted by the International Labor Organization a month after Con-
vention No. 92, and revised in 1957, has not yet received sufficient ratification to make it
effective. None of the European nations has signed it, except Sweden, which exempted
from its ratification the wages section of the convention adopted at the United Nations'
specialized agency's 1958 conference. See 6A id. at 717; N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1959, § 5, p.
17, col. 6. See generally DcroR-GFNERAL, INTErNATIONAL LAOUR OmicE, Rsoar To
INmTERNATIONAL LA-BouR CONFERENCE; 41ST SEss., at 28-36 (1958).
116. See Brief for Plaintiffs (affidavit), Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime
Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Typical articles employed were those of Italy,
the Netherlands, and West Germany.
1.17. As of June 30, 1959, United States companies and their affiliates had registered
162 vessels, totalling 1,896,043 gross tons under the flags of the United, Kingdom, the
Netherlands, France, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Finland. See Sum-
mary of Ocemgoing Vessels.
118. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, §§ 113-24, 225; Mer-
chant Shipping Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 48, § 25 & First Schedule; Merchant Shipping Act,
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 44, §§ 1-3; Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, §§ 2-4.
120. The statute is, therefore, distinguishable from the few instances, notably the sea-
men's wage cases, in which specific congressional intent was found. See notes 64-67 mipra
and accompanying text.
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flag-of-convenience vessels are almost always manned by wholly alien crews,121
application of American labor legislation on shipboard would run counter to
statements in Be=nz that the relevant congressional history "inescapably de-
scribes the boundaries of the [Taft-Hartley] Act as including only the work-
ingmen of our own country and its possessions."'1 22 Furthermore, Bcnz gives
no indication that American nationality of the vessel's ultimate owners has any
bearing upon the jurisdictional reach of the statute. Indeed, since neither the
lower court nor the Supreme Court inquired in its opinion into the nationality
of the stockholders of the Panamanian corporation which operated the Libe-
rian-flag ship, their nationality seems irrelevant to the rationale of 'the de-
cision.1 23 In addition, application of American labor legislation aboard these
vessels might lead to retaliation and protest by foreign states, particularly the
flag state, which have exclusive interests in the vessel despite American own-
ership.
In sum, NLRB assertion of jurisdiction over employer-employee relations
aboard American-owned flag-of-convenience vessels would constitute a breach
of the principles of comity embodied in international law. An argument might
be made that the United States' exclusive interest in the welfare of American
labor, as expressed in the labor statutes, might be fostered by such an asser-
tion of jurisdiction and thus justify the probable interference with foreign
exclusive interests. But, although some -interests exist which override comity
considerations, 124 the welfare of native seamen does not seem to fit into that
category, since it is unclear whether that interest even overrides other Ameri-
can exclusive and inclusive interests which could 'be damaged by application
of the labor acts aboard flag-of-convenience ships. Application might deter
entry of -the affected vessels to United States ports and thus injure the in-
clusive interest in international commerce, or may force American owners
either to transfer the vessels to other foreign flags or to sell them, and thus
undermine exclusive interests in a merchant marine readily available for de-
fense purposes and/or in protecting American investments. In addition, even
the exclusive interest in United States labor might be impinged upon if
NLRB jurisdiction over flag-of-convenience vessels led first to similar juris-
diction over all American-owned foreign-flag ships, and then to retaliatory
application of foreign labor laws in foreign ports.
REMEDIES AGAINST AMERICAN UNION PICKETING ON SHORE
Applicability of the Taft-Hartley Act
Shoreside picketing of foreign-flag ships by American unions has given rise
to several shipowner suits for monetary and injunctive relief in both state and
121. See Brief for Plaintiff (affidavit), Afran Transp. Corp. v. National Maritime
Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
122. 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
123. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text.
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federal courts.1 2 5 Since the United States is obliged to furnish the owners of
foreign-flag ships access to a forum on an equal footing with American-flag
operators, 2 6 the first issue raised by this litigation is whether such picketing
is "arguably subject" to sections 7 ("rights of employees") or 8 ("unfair
labor practices") of the national labor acts.'2 7 If so, even though Taft-Hart-
ley does not regulate labor relations on shipboard, it would provide exclusive
remedies against shoreside picketing.' 2 8
Such a distinction between Taft-Hartley's applicability to an employer's
relations with his own employees on one hand and his contacts with outside
unions on the other comes from Local 25, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., [The Piggy-Back Case],1 - decided in 1956. There,
the Supreme Court held that a railroad, whose labor relations were governed
by the Railway Labor Act ' 3 0 and not by Taft-Hartley, must nonetheless seek
relief exclusively under Taft-Hartley from concerted activity (arguably pro-
tected or prohibited under sections 7 or 8) by the Teamsters, who, attempting
to prevent the railroad from carrying truck trailers "piggy back" on flat cars,
boycotted trailer delivery. And, in Moore Dry Dock,' 3' a drydock owner
sought relief from the NLRB to end American union picketing of a Liberian-
flag vessel undergoing repair. The Board accepted jurisdiction and determined
whether the picketing was prohibited by Taft-Hartley, even though it had
decided in an earlier case '13 2 that regulating employer-employee relations on
board the same ship was -beyond the jurisdictional scope of the act.
The majority opinion in Benz, 33 however, failed to make any distinction
between Taft-Hartley regulation of shipboard labor relations and the use of
Taft-Hartley to give a remedy against shoreside American picketing. The
Court emphasized that the case arose from a shipowner-crew dispute, m  and
125. Federal court cases have resulted in the following reported opinions: Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957); Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S.
Co., 265 F.2d 780 (1959); Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp.
416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Fianza Cia. Nav. S.A. v. Benz, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 66733 (D. Ore.
1958). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1960, p. 66, col. 1 (new suit against Int'l Maritime
Workers). State court opinions, though unreported, have been noted in the press. See,
e.g., id., Dec. 4, 1958, p. 78, col. 1.
126. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Liberia, Aug. 8,
1938, 54 Stat. 1739, T.S. No. 956; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights
With Honduras, Dec. 7, 1927, 45 Stat 2618, T.S. No. 764; FREEMAN, ThE IN.TEMNATIONAL
REsPONSIBILITY OF STATEs FOR DENIAL OF JusTIcE 215-16 (1938) ; Wilson, Access-to-
Courts Prozisions in United States Commtercial Treaties, 47 Am. J. INe'L L 20 (193).
127. National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(b), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b) (1958).
128. "[W]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
129. 350 U.S. 155 (1956).
130. 44 Stat 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952).
131. Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
132. Compania Maritima Sansoc, Ltd., 2 CCH LAa. L. REP. f 10081 (4th ed. 1950).
133. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
134. Id. at 142-43.
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seems to have concluded that a remedy against the picketing unions, whose
aid had been enlisted by the crew, was inextricably linked with shipboard
labor relations. 3 5 Such a reading explains the Court's otherwise inapposite
discussion of the principles of comity governing a coastal state's exercise of
jurisdiction on 'board foreign-flag vessels.' 8 6 It also provides an arguable dis-
tinction from The Piggy-Back Case in which the Court emphasized that the
Teamsters' activities were "unrelated" to the admittedly exempt relations be-
tween the railroad and its employees.' 37 But the maritime union's objective of
enhancing job opportunities by curtailing the flag of convenience system is
comparable to the Teamsters' objective of retaining employment opportunities
for its truckdriver members by curtailing the piggy-back system; if the latter
was subject to sections 7 or 8, so is the former. By sidestepping Piggy-
Back, which it neither cited nor discussed, the Court ignored the contention
of both the union 138 and the dissenting Justice '39 that NLRB remedial jur-
isdiction should have been exclusive even if Taft-Hartley were inapplicable to
shipowner-crew relations. The Court's equating NLRB shoreside remedy
with NLRB shipboard regulation, and deciding both under principles of
comity, relieved it of the necessity of spelling out the reasons for holding that
state remedies were not preempted by Taft-Hartley and for thus avoiding the
thrust of The Piggy-Back Case. But the ,Court apparently relied on the exist-
ence of a preexisting shipowner-crew dispute to make this equation. There-
fore, whether the same decision would be appropriate in a more typical future
case not arising from such a dispute was left unanswered, and Ben must be
examined to ascertain whether the shipboard dispute was crucial to the de-
cision.
It might be argued that Benz represents a blanket refusal, in flag-of-con-
venience picketing cases, to subject unions to Taft-Hartley sanctions when
they have no countervailing Taft-Hartley rights against the employer. This
argument would stress the fact that the act envisions a continuing employer-
employee relationship and provides rights and remedies for both sides tailored
to create a favorable climate for collective bargaining, and might further as-
sert that when the built-in restraints inherent in a continuing economic re-
lationship are absent, as in the case of picketing an oceangoing vessel, the act's
remedies are inadequate or inappropriate. In addition, labor relations on such
vessels are governed by foreign laws and articles of employment, 140 whereas
the plaintiff in Piggy-Back was subject to obligations imposed by the Railway
Labor Act, which, as part of the same national labor policy, are similar to
135. See id. at 146-47.
136. Ibid.; see notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
137. Local 25, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155,
1S9 (1956).
138. Reply Brief for Petitioners, pp. 6-7, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A. 353
U.S. 138 (1957).
139. 353 U.S. at 147 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
140. See notes 116, 119 supra and accompanying text.
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those imposed by Taft-Hartley.14 But arguments such as these fail to explain
Benz. It would be strange to base a ruling that state sanctions are not pre-
empted by Taft-Hartley-and therefore may be imposed upon unions-on a
theory that to impose NLRB sanctions on them would be to violate Taft-
Hartley's scheme of mutuality of rights and remedies. More important, a con-
tinuing employer-employee relationship is, in fact, not a prerequisite to obtain-
ing relief under the national act; any affected secondary employer, such as the
dry dock operator in Moore,14" or, for that matter, perhaps anyone, 143 may
bring an unfair-labor-practice complaint. It is therefore essential to look else-
where for the underlying rationale of Benz.
It might be argued that the Court in Benz based its decision on a theory
of comity among nations relevant to union action against foreign-flag vessels
but not against domestic railroads. Such an argument would proceed from two
assumptions: First, that Taft-Hartley would deny the picketed shipowner re-
lief available to him under tort law,144 which would be applicable to the
picketing were the national act not accorded preemptive effect; second, that
a failure to grant relief would constitute a governmental interference with the
141. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, 300 U.S. 515,
553 (1937) ("[The act's] provisions are aimed at the settlement of industrial disputes by
the promotion of collective bargaining...."); Note, 68 YALE L.J. 77, 80 n.9 (1958) (col-
lecting authorities).
"The purposes of [the Railway Labor Act as amended] ... are: (1) To avoid any
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2)
to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial,
as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor
organization;... (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all dis-
putes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions;...
48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1952).
142. See Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
143. See National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), as amended, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958) ("Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in ...
any ... unfair labor practice... !'). (Emphasis added.) But cf. Sailors' Union, sipra
note 142 (reference to "person aggrieved" as filing party).
144. While the national labor act provides expeditious procedures by which the Labor
Board may obtain a court injunction pursuant to a certain unfair labor practice charge,
see Labor-Management Relations Act § 10 (1), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)
(1958) ; Note, 69 YALE L.J. 309, 319 n.64 (1959), a procedure almost as rapid as direct
application to a federal court, compare FmD. R. Crv. P. 65(b), the Board may so -ct only
when it has "reasonable cause!' to believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed.
Damages are available under Taft-Hartley only if the union is held to have committed a
§ 8(b) (4) unfair labor practice. See Labor-Management Relations Act § 303, 61 Stat. 158
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 545 (1959) (damages available in
federal courts). Of course, the NLRB's power to issue cease and desist orders and to take
"such affirmative action... as will effectuate the policies of this Act" requires unfair labor
practice findings. See National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), as amended, 61 Stat. 147
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958). Hence, if the picketing were not an unfair labor prac-
tice, preemption would be tantamount to precluding all relief.
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internal economy of the vessel.1 45 This theory offers one explanation for the
Court's concluding reference to the possibilities of "international discord" and
"retaliative action.' 46 Nonetheless, even if holding Taft-Hartley preemptive
would deny foreign-flag shipowners relief and thus have adverse effects upon
foreign shipping, this theory probably does not justify a broad reading of
Benz. Since picketing of flag-of-convenience vessels is undertaken by private
parties, injury to foreign exclusive interests probably may not be charged to
a positive exercise of jurisdiction by the United States. 47 The situation is
therefore distinguishable from application of Taft-Hartley to shipboard activ-
ities, which would put the full power of the United States-as sovereign
coastal state--qbehind union efforts to organize the vessel. And remedying
shoreside picketing exclusively under Taft-Hartley would not displace the law
of the flag state; the issue is determining applicable United States law rather
than resolving a conflict with foreign law. Withholding a state remedy against
picketing results in no change in the law governing the vessel, does not in-
terfere with existing contractual or bargaining relationships on shipboard, and,
therefore, does not invade the internal economy of the vessel within the nor-
mal contemplation of that doctrine. 148 And, as a general proposition, the
availability of remedies for particular litigants should not be determinative of
the act's jurisdictional scope. So long as foreign shipowners have access to
United States tribunals for remedies equal to those forthcoming to United
States-flag shipowners, they should not be able to invoke international law
principles or treaty obligations to allow them greater protection. In those cir-
cumstances where relief is forthcoming only when one union has received
Board certification, 49 a foreign-flag shipowner who recognizes an American
union but is denied certification by NLRB refusal to assume jurisdiction over
shipboard relations might be denied a Taft-Hartley remedy available to his
145. Union picketing might prevent the foreign-flag vessels from docking if accom-
plished, as in Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959), by picket
ships in the harbor. Or, once docked, the vessels could be kept from discharging or loading
cargoes and from departing. Delay in delivery or loading might cause shippers to breach
delivery date clauses in sales contracts, or charterers to breach such provisions in contracts
of affreightment. Time charterers might be forced to pay overlap at higher rates, and extra
crew and maintenance costs would have to be paid. See The Rygya, 161 Fed. 106, 107 (2d
Cir. 1908). These costs could accrue to the shipowner or charterer and, if the threat of
picketing were persistent, might in practice bar his entering United States ports. Although
the unions may now be deterred by the damage awards in both Benz and Panama, pre-
emption might remove such deterrence and lead to more widespread and disruptive picket-
ing.
146. 353 U.S. at 147.
147. Cf. BRIGGs 711-13; EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 82-85 (1928).
148. Cf. note 93 szpra and accompanying text (Jones Act). Nor would private picket-
ing seem to infringe the "liberty freely to come" clauses of commercial treaties. See note
107 supra and accompanying text.
149. E.g., Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (c), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(c) (1958).
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American-flag counterparts. But this situation is too remote to justify holding
the act inapplicable to all shoreside picketing.
Since these alternative explanations of the Benz decision seem untenable, it
must be concluded that the preexisting shipboard dispute was crucial to the
rationale of that opinion. Therefore, Benz is probably inapposite authority for
flag-of-convenience picketing cases which do not have a similar link with ship-
board labor relations. And, even when such a dispute exists, the Benz decision
to allow remedies against the picketing in accordance with state law, while
denying NLRB remedies because of a reluctance "to run interference in ...
a delicate field of international relations,"' ° is questionable. The Court's plac-
ing shipboard labor relations beyond the scope of American labor legislation
was proper under principles of comity. But why the Court apparently felt that
federal remedies would lead to involvement in "disputes between nationals of
other countries operating ships under foreign laws,"''I while state remedies
would not, is unclear. The Court might have believed that granting a state
remedy against picketing would not of itself constitute an interference with
shipboard activities, but that invocation of Taft-Hartley remedies ashore would
logically lead, either in Benz itself or in future cases, to establishment of Taft-
Hartley regulation aboard. Such a fear could have been dispelled, however, by
an express disclaimer in the opinion. MIore likely, the Court was of the opinion
that, since the crew asked the union to represent them in the controversy with
their employer, the union was not acting as an American union, but rather as
the spokesmen of a foreign crew,152 and that the entire complex of facts con-
stituted a shipowner-crew dispute arising out of the internal order of the
vessels. But if it did, it would follow that remedies against picketing, like
other aspects of the dispute, were governed by the lav of the flag state and
were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state's consul.la
In any event, if Benz is authority only for cases involving preexisting ship-
board disputes, the federal preemption doctrine, as evidenced in The Piggy-
Back Case,'54 would probably apply in most employers' actions for remedies
against flag-of-convenience picketing. No extrastatutory reasons exist to take
peaceful picketing by United States unions which are "labor organizations"
150. 353 U.S. at 147.
151, Id. at 143.
152. See id. at 140.
153. See notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text. If the dispute was regarded as
one "concerning the adjustment of wages and the execution of contracts relating thereto,"
rather than one "arising out of the internal order," the consul will have jurisdiction con-
current with that of "local authorities." See text following note 105 supra. But this w~uld
not exclude the NLRB while including state courts.
The shipboard dispute in Benz could be placed in either of these pigeonholes. The facts
involved shipboard refusal to obey the Master's orders, 353 U.S. at 139, claims of "filthy
conditions ... and contaminated food," id. at 139 n.2, and a demand that the Master "bar-
gain with them [the crew] on wages and conditions," ibid.
154. See notes 129-30 supra- and accompanying text.
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composed of "employees"' 155 under the act beyond the act's ambit. Shipowners
may argue that preemption would lead to uncontrolled picketing which would,
in turn, threaten their competitive position and thus interfere with foreign
investment and with defense requirements of a ready merchant marine. 1 0 But
only a specific expression of congressional intent, rather than congressional
acquiescence in ship transfers, would -seem sufficient to support an interpreta-
tion of United States exclusive interests which might abrogate the national
labor act's explicit guaranty of the right to concerted activity for mutual aid
or benefit. 157
If Taft-Hartley preempts state relief, the question arises whether American
union picketing of flag-of-convenience vessels is an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b) of that act.158 Nonviolent picketing would constitute an 8(b) (4)
secondary boycott under NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council,'50 decided
in 1951, if one, even if not its only, purpose rwas found to 'be the use of
economic force against secondary employers-such as stevedore or drydock
companies--or their employees rather than the primary employer, the flag-of-
convenience shipowner. Since all picketing not confined to employee entrances
will affect secondary employers dealing with the employer picketed, and since
"purpose" is difficult to prove, the NLRB, followed iby a line of court of
appeals decisions, attempted, in Moore Dry Dock,160 to fashion a workable
rule to govern such cases: picketing as near the situs of a primary employer
as circumstances allow is not a secondary boycott if the public is informed
that the dispute is solely with the primary employer. Under this rule, there-
fore, flag-of-convenience picketing can be immune from 8(b)(4) provided
these conditions are met, even though stevedores and dry dock companies are
prevented from dealing with the picketed ship.
If, on the other hand, "an object" of the picketing is organization of the
crews of flag-of-convenience vessels, it might arguably constitute organiza-
tional picketing, which, in certain circumstances, is an unfair labor practice
under Taft-Hartley section 8(b) (7), added in 1959.161 For example, when
155. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 2(3), (5), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (5) (1958).
156. See text following note 124 supra.
157. National Labor Relations Act § 7, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1958).
158. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b), 61. Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b) (1958).
159. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
160. Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950); see Seafarers
Int'l Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (collecting court of appeals
cases).
161. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (7), added by Labor-Management Re-
porting & Disclosure Act of 1959, No. 86-257, § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544.
The unions might try to escape the unfair labor practice charge by disclaiming any in-
tent to organize the vessels. This was the union strategy in Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S.
Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959). See Reply Brief of Appellants, p. 6. The unions cannot
picket foreign-flag ships to force a discharge of their alien crews because such discharge,
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a union does not file, within thirty days of its organizational picketing, a rep-
resentation petition requiring the NLRB to hold a representation election, its
right to picket is restricted. 16 2 Since the crew of a foreign-flag vessel is be-
yond the regulatory scope of the act, it would seem impossible to fulfill these
requirements: a valid representation petition could not be filed nor a valid
election held. Hence, an unfair labor practice could never be held to have
occurred. Organizational picketing is also an unfair labor practice if the pick-
eted employer's employees have already designated a certified bargaining rep-
resentative, or have, within the preceding year, participated in a valid rep-
resentation election.163 While the crews of flag-of-convenience vessels could
not do either, some flag-of-convenience vessels may be organized by foreign
seamen's unions which are recognized by foreign law,10t and it might be
argued that such prior organization should be viewed as the equivalent of
NLRB certification for purposes of giving rise to an unfair labor practice.
Applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia (Anti-Injunction) Act
If, however, Benz is 'broadly read, and Taft-Hartley never given -preemptive
effect in flag-of-convenience picketing cases, a shipowner seeking injunctive
relief in federal court will face the additional hurdle of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, which provides that no federal court has jurisdiction to issue an injunc-
tion "in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute."'C The act de-
fines a labor dispute broadly to include "any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment .. .regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."1 60 Because of the
concluding clause of this definition, the Supreme Court has held that picket-
ing by a Negro organization, not a labor union, to force an employer to hire
Negro clerks is a protected labor dispute.'0 7 Thus, even if the American
unions are not the representatives of the alien crews, and are barred from
being certified as such in the future, their efforts to "discourage the further
transfer of vessels to -foreign flags . . . [to arouse] public opinion, . . . [and
to raise] the standards aboard foreign flag vessels"'" would seem to constitute
without the prior consent of the Attorney General, would be illegal, see Immigration &
Nationality Act § 256, 66 Stat. 2-.3 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1286 (1958), and a strike to force
commission of an illegal act is itself illegal, see NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 997
(7th Cir. 1945). See also American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944). Nor can unions
legally picket to force an immediate change in seamen's articles of employment. See Benz
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62, 64, 66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
890 (1956) ; cf. Rees v. United States, 95 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938).
162. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, No. 86-257, § 704(c),
73 Stat. 544.
163. Ibid.
164. See N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 22, 1959, p. 47, col. 1.
165. 47 Stat. 70 (1,932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
166. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1958).
167. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
168. See Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416, 423 (S D.
N.Y. 1958).
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a Norris-LaGuardia labor dispute with the shipowners. It could be alterna-
tively contended that flag-of-convenience picketing does not concern "terms or
conditions of employment" under the act, on the ground that unbridled union
exertion of economic power within the territorial limits of the United States
to prevent employers from making foreign investments and realizing labor
cost savings of operating abroad are not protected 'by Norris-LaGuardia.
Union picketing to force flags-of-convenience vessels under United States
registry, from which most have been transferred according to statute, is not
a legitimate labor objective, the argument would run, since decisions to fly
foreign flags and to invest abroad lie within the prerogatives of manage-
ment.169 Such a restricted definition of "terms and conditions of employment"
finds adequate support, however, in neither legislative intent 170 nor previous
cases. 171 So long as the management decisions sought to be reversed are rea-
sonably related to employment opportunities, union picketing has been held
covered by the act. In the most relevant Supreme (Court case,172 a cutrate
system of marketing milk-the "vendor system"--allowed a group of dairies
employing nonunion labor to undercut dairies employing union drivers in
making door-to-door deliveries. Because the vendor system was making in-
roads into the job opportunities of union drivers, the union picketed retail
outlets supplied through the vendor system in an attempt either to force
abandonment of that system or to impose union wage standards on vendor
system personnel. The 'Court found that a "labor dispute" existed and that an
injunction was barred by Norris-LaGuardia. And, the Second Circuit, in
Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. Clayton,'73 found that teamsters picketing of the
terminal of a trucking firm which leased trucks from their owner-drivers to
force the firm to conform its lease agreements to other firms' contracts with
their union drivers involved a "labor dispute."
169. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Injunc-
tion, p. 7, Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, Civil No. 140-156, S.D.N.Y.,
1958.
170. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
171. The Afran Memorandum cited two cases for the proposition that the seamen's
unions' activity is "not a labor objective or the subject of a labor controversy." But neither
supports the point for which it was introduced. In Bakery Sales Drivers Union v.
Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948), the Court found a dispute between "two businessmen."
Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1958), was a private
antitrust action by a merchant against a union which was acting as a commercial enter-
prise. In a more relevant case, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R.,
246 F.2d 1.14 (6th Cir. 1957), a railroad's decision to close a railroad yard was held not
to have created a labor dispute because the possible loss of jobs was only "anticipatory."
But this case offers no support for shipowners in the normal flag-of-convenience picketing
case, where the alleged loss of jobs caused by the shipowners' decision to transfer to for-
eign registry has already occurred.
172. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91
(1940).
173. 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1955).
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In Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co.,174 the Ninth Circuit, relying on a
broad construction of Benz, ruled Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable to flag-of-
convenience picketing cases.17 The Court apparently regarded Norris-La-
Guardia as a substantive labor relations statute similar in scope to Taft-Hart-
ley.17 6 But Norris-LaGuardia may be jurisdictionally broader. While Taft-
Hartley is a comprehensive scheme setting forth mutual employer-employee
rights and remedies, Norris-LaGuardia, on its face, is a limitation of the power
of the federal judiciary to grant injunctive relief in all kinds of labor disputes,
no matter what the context. 17i Therefore, even a reading of Benz which de-
clares Taft-Hartley inapplicable to any foreign-flag case does not necessarily
place a similar limitation on Norris-LaGuardia.
Jurisdiction of Courts
If, however, both Taft-Hartley and Norris-LaGuardia (and with the latter,
its various state versions) ,178 are held inapplicable to flag of convenience picket-
ing, state and federal courts would be free to award whatever relief state law
may afford. In such circumstances, a holding, analogous to Benz, that the
granting of state relief would constitute an unreasonable interference vith
foreign commerce would seem impossible; indeed established principles of in-
ternational law and United States treaty obligations guarantee aliens access to
a forum for redress of wrongs in accordance with local law.170
Federal Courts: Diversity Jurisdiction
Normally, a shipowner would be able to initiate his suit in a federal district
court-or the defendant union may be able to remove it there-under the
grant of diversity jurisdiction. 80 But the requisite proof of diversity of citi-
zenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants may pose problems in a mi-
nority of states. Because seamen's unions are unincorporated associations,18 1
174. 265 F2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959).
175. Contra, Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958). Although Fianza Cia. Nay. S.A. v. Benz, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 66733 (D. Ore.
1958), held that no labor dispute existed, the unions had apparently conceded that they
were not in dispute with the owner; indeed, "perhaps, they picked the wrong vessel in this
case." Id. at 66736.
176. 265 F.2d at 786-87.
177. See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91,
101 (1940).
178. E.g., CoxN. GEx. STAT. §§ 31-112 to -119 (1958) ; MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 214,
§ 9A (1955); Oz. REv. STAT. §§ 662-010, 662.040-.130 (1957) ; WAsn. RE,. CoDE An-..
§§ 49.32.011-.910 (1958) ; see 2 TEmER, LAoR DspuTrrs AM COLECrIVE BArGAImImG § 434
(1940) ; 46 COLU'h. L. REv. 860, 861 n.6 (1946) (collecting statutes).
179. See note 126 supra.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
181 See, e.g., Record, p. 14, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138
(1957) (Sailors' Union of the Pacific) ; Record, p. 3, Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co.,
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they are generally considered not to possess a single citizenship. 182 Although
some states have enacted statutes permitting suit against unions as entities,183
proof of citizenship diverse from that of every member of the defendant union
is required.1 8 4 Since a seamen's union may have several thousand members,188
proof of citizenship of every member may be impossible to obtain and would
often reveal that, since the union has resident alien members, such diversity
does not exist.' 8 6 In practice, therefore, the shipowner can bring a diversity
suit in a federal court only by means of a class action. Although a class action
against a seamen's union local would be proper under rule 23(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, a recent Third Circuit case 187 could 'be read
to indicate that rule 17(b), which provides that "capacity to sue or be sued
shall be determined 'by the law of the state," bars such an action in district
courts located in a state where class actions against unions are not allowed
by statute or by decision.' 88 But even if this severely criticized case 180 is
followed, class actions against unions are possible in most coastal states han-
dling an appreciable amount of foreign-flag tonnage.' 00 Shipowner actions for
265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959) (Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL; Seafarer's Int'l Union
of North America).
182. See Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporated Associations Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 53 MICH. L. Rv. 945, 950-51 (1955) ; Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1182, 1183-
84 (1959). But see American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 685-88 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954) ; Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 742 n.174 (1957) (col-
lecting cases).
183. See, e.g., CONN. GEN . STAT. § 52-76 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3904
(1953) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:64-1 (1952).
184. See Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951.); Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. Textile Workers, 149 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1957); International
Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1940).
185. See THE WoRa ALMANAC AND BooK OF FAcrs 53 (1959). Although the ship-
owner may sue the union local, he would probably wish to join the international to ensure
satisfaction of a claim for damages. Besides, the seaman's local may itself be too large to
permit ready discovery of the citizenship of all its members.
186. See Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 851 (1929)
(aliens, even of diverse nationality, are not of diverse citizenship under § 1332). Al-
though this was the stated reason why the plaintiff in Panama had disclaimed diversity
jurisdiction, 265 F.2d at 782, such jurisdiction could have been established through the
device of a class action, see note 190 infra.
187. Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
188. See Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1182, 1192 (1959) ; 107 U. PA. L. REV. 559, 561 (1959) ;
Pennsylvania seems to be the only state where class actions against unions are definitely
prohibited. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Textile Workers, 149 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa.
1.957) ; PA. R. Crv. P. 2152, 2153; Note of Procedural Rules Committee to PA. R. Civ. P.
2230.
189. See Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1182, 1188-92 (1959) ; 107 U. PA. L. Rzv. 559, 562 (1959).
190. See, e.g., Pascale v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147 (D. Mass. 1951) ; Cross v. Oneida
Paper Prods. Co., 117 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1954); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 382;
N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAW § 13; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.08.070 (1956); TEx. R. Civ. P.
42. Even under a broad interpretation of Underwood v. Maloney, the federal district court
in Panama would have been able to allow a diversity action against union members as
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injunctive relief will give rise to equity doctrines even more favorable to class
actions, 191 and may make practical suits against individual officers, rather than
entire unions. On the other hand, state lav may bar access to the union treas-
ury for damage claims brought in a class action.'
0 2
Federal Courts: Federal Question Jurisdiction
If diversity jurisdiction is unavailable, a shipowner may attempt to estab-
lish federal court jurisdiction on other grounds. In Panama, the shipowner
disclaimed diversity jurisdiction, and attempted to establish federal question
jurisdiction under section 1331 of the Judicial Code.' 03 In a confusing opinion,
the court stated that the cause of action was "'based on interference with mari-
time traffic on navigable waters and on interference with the performance of
a maritime contract constituting maritime torts," 10 4 governed by substantive
law which is "basically.federal."' 01
By apparently viewing violations of the general maritime law as giving rise
to federal question jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit opinion misconstrued 100
the Supreme Court's holding a few weeks earlier in Roncro v. Intcrvational
Terminal Operating Co.,' 97 which held that the constitutional grant of judicial
power sharply separated "admiralty and maritime" cases from cases "arising
under" the laws of the United States. In the light of the saving-to-suitors
clause, the fact that a cause of action would be cognizable in admiralty is in-
sufficient to establish jurisdiction on the law-equity side of the court.'08 Thus
the latter jurisdiction would seem to arise only if the cause of action alleges
a violation of statutory law, a treaty, or the -Constitution.
Although the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Roincro by demon-
strating that Panama was not a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
because the plaintiff sought an injunction, not only damages, 0 9 the distinction
is unconvincing. The court considered Panamna a nonmaritime case because
representatives of a class, since Washington allows such actions. As damages are recover-
able in Washington from the funds of an unincorporated association whose members are
sued in a class action, see St. Germain v. Bakery Workers Union, 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac.
665 (1917), the disclaimer of § 1332 jurisdiction in Panama is inexplicable.
191. In Florida, for example, class actions are possible only in equity. See FLA. R. Civ.
P. 3.6.
192. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.), cct. denied,
352 U.S. 890 (1956) (judgment against union members as a class unenforcible against
union treasury under Oregon law).
-1,93. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
194. 265 F2d at 782.
195. Id. at 783.
196. See The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HAMv. L REV. 126, 141 (1959).
197. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
198. Prior to Romero, the circuits had been split. Compare Doucette v. Vincent, 194
F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952), ci~th Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d
615 (2d Cir. 1955), md Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
199. See 265 F2d at 783-86.
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admiralty courts have traditionally refused to grant injunctive relief;200 thus,
it concluded, nothing had to be saved, no conflict with the saving clause
existed, and law-equity jurisdiction was not barred. But, assuming that shore-
side picketing can be considered a maritime issue,20 1 the case would not seem
to fall outside admiralty jurisdiction since, as pointed out in a footnote to
Romero, the type of remedy sought does not determine the scope of admiralty
jurisdiction; and a case involving a maritime claim is within admiralty juris-
diction "regardless of the remedy sought. '20 2 Nor does it follow that because
an action is not admiralty it is law-equity. It might be argued-although the
Panama court did not-that -federal judicial power over all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, as provided by article III of the Constitution, is
broader than the Judiciary Act's grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
to the federal courts. According to this argument, a residuum of cases exist
which are beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts sitting in admiralty
'but are still within the judicial power of the United States.20 3 But even if such
a residuum of cases exists they are not necessarily cognizable under section
1331. The alternative possibility is equally tenable: Congress 'has not yet seen
fit to exercise the full extent of its constitutional power and has left the fed-
eral courts without power to hear such a residuum of cases.
The Ninth ,Circuit attempted affirmatively to ground federal question juris-
diction on a ",breach of a federal duty. '204 While the court did not indicate
the nature of this "federal duty," it may have contemplated cases in which
federal question jurisdiction had been sought on the grounds of interference
with interstate or foreign commerce. But the few cases in which such a con-
tention was made have rejected it.205 Or, the circuit court may sub silentio
have affirmed that part of the district court opinion finding an "impairment"
of United States' international obligations 2 0 -- apparently the commercial
treaty with Liberia-as urged 'by the shipowner. But, since treaties are con-
tracts ,between states, in the absence of specific language in the treaty207 or
200. See Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454, 457 (1935) (dictum);
Sound Marine & Mach. Corp. v. Westchester County, 100 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 642 (1939) ; Paterson v. Dakin, 31 Fed. 682 (S.D. Ala. 1887) ; 4 BENE-
DIcr § 613, at 211 (6th ed. 1940). But see The Olga, 254 Fed. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) (dictum).
See generally Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 43 YALE L.J. 1 (1933).
201. See notes 211-13 infra and accompanying text.
202. 358 U.S. at 367 n.23.
203. See 59 COLUM. L. REv. 946 (1959).
204. 265 F.2d at 785.
205. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th
Cir. 1947); Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen, 132 F.2d 265 (7th
Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 321 U.S. 50 (1944); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Nolan,
240 Fed. 754 (D. Mont. 1917); Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90 (1908)
(dictum).
206. See Record, pp. 34-35, Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.
1959) (unreported opinion of Boldt, J., Findings of Fact XIII and XVIII).
207. See Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 15 (1928) (lan-
guage found to give private parties cause of action).
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in separate legislation,208 they do not give a cause of action against private
parties 2 09 to aliens claiming rights under them.2 10
Federal Courts: Admiralty Jurisdiction
A shipowner might also attempt to establish jurisdiction on the admiralty
side of a federal court on grounds that union picketing constitutes a maritime
tort-interference with a maritime contract of affreightment. Under tradition-
al admiralty doctrine, a tort is maritime only if it "occurs" on navigable
waters,211 and according to accepted conflicts-of-law principles, a tort "occurs"
where the harm is felt.2 12 But it is unclear where the harm derived from in-
terference with a contract of affreightment is felt. Arguably, the harm is felt
on shore at the point of nondelivery. Or, in the case of perishables, the harm
might 'be held to have occurred in the hold of the vessel, on navigable waters,
where the goods deteriorated in value. Nevertheless, the usual rule which
equates situs of tort with situs of injury seems inappropriate when the tort
is interference with a maritime contract since, unlike a personal injury, for
example, the harm is not felt at a single and easily ascertainable point. In-
208. See, e.g., Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) where suit was brought in a
state court under a California statute interpreted to grant a cause of action in state courts
to aliens claiming rights under United States treaties. See Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236,
256 Pac. 545 (1.927).
209. A cause of action against the Government, which has not been attempted in any
of the flag-of-convenience picketing cases, would of course be possible only if the Govern-
ment could be held to have waived its sovereign immunity. See O'Reilly de Camara v.
Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908) (dismissing suit, on sovereign immunity theory, brought under
statute granting federal district courts jurisdiction over suits by aliens for tortious viola-
tion of treaty or the law of nations) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1958).
210. See Filhiol v. Maurice, 185 U.S. 108 (1902). A long neglected jurisdictional
statute, 28 U.S.,C. § 1350 (1958), grants federal district courts power to hear "any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." Although this statute has never been held to grant a cause of action,
such interpretation might be possible. See O'Reilly de Camara Y. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45
(1908) (plaintiff's suit under § 1350 against a United States Army officer, for deprivation
of rights during the military occupation of Cuba was dismissed because of sovereign im-
munity, not because the statute is purely jurisdictional and creates no cause of action). See
also Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 Fed. Cas. 810 (No. 1607) (D.S.C. 1795) (cause of action un-
clear).
211. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 34-35 (1865); Forgione v. United
States, 202 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1953) ; 1 Baxunicr § 127 (6th ed. 1940). The precise holding
of The Plymouth, that the destruction of a wharf due to shipboard negligence was not a
maritime tort because the injury was consummated on land, was reversed by 62 Stat. 495
(1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1952), which extends the federal admiralty jurisdiction to such
"amphibious torts."
212. "Ordinarily it is the locus of the tort which governs, and where the injury is on
the water though the defendant's act was on the land, that locus is determined by the
water." The Poznan, 276 Fed. 418, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1.921) (L. Hand, J.) ; Hermann v. Port
Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. 646 (N.D. Cal. 1895) ; REsTATm,T, Co.xmrcrs § 377 (1934) ;
HARa & Jams, Toars § 30.4 (1956). See also The America, 34 F. Supp. 855 (E.D.N.Y.
1940).
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deed, the only relevant cases assume that the tort of interference occurs on
navigable waters; "the injury must be maritime in its character as much as
though the case sounded in contract . . . . [I]f that contract was maritime
enough in its character to -base a libel upon it in contract, the injury result-
ing from the wrongful act on shore was as maritime, because it was the same
thing.12 13 Moreover, the federal judge sitting in admiralty would seem to be
better equipped than state court judges to 'fix damages in foreign-flag picket-
ing cases, since factors peculiar to maritime commerce must be considered.
And, while previous cases invoking admiralty jurisdiction for interference
with maritime contracts were actions by shippers, 2 14 a shipowner or charterer
would also seem to have a cause of action. But even if admiralty jurisdiction
is available, the shipowner may find such jurisdiction unattractive because in-
junctive relief 215 would not seem possible.
213. The Poznan, supra note 212, at 433-34 (inducement of breach); accord, Sidney
Blumenthal & Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 847
(1929) (deliberately wrongful transshipment of cargo; "If any tort be maritime, certainly
this was one.") (L. Hand, J.).
214. See cases cited note 213 suipra.
215. See note 200 supra.
